Margit Fauser and Benjamin Schwenn, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin The Dialectics of Marginalisation: Inequality and Difference

Such an interpretation may look at local non-party organizations and their political or social commitment as well as analyze TV consumerism as a way of creative reception. Hence difference is a positive opportunity for a lot of cultural productions at the margin. There are different kinds of cultural and/or political articulations within the margins that may be seen as authentical expressions of a certain identity. That identity is originally grown on the ground of marginalisation. Those articulations have a wide range such as the collective theft of electricity, unorganized neighborhood help or organized local political resistance.
Still, maintaining a normative point of view, there is a fundamental contradiction between regarding marginality as the ground for those creative articulations on the one hand and condemning it as the exclusion from most of the possibilities a society may offer on the other. There is a dialectics of inequality and difference. Even if difference - the cultural aspect - is seen positively as a constructive potential, inequality - as the socio-economic aspect - hardly can.¹ This dialectics is a genuine phenomena of the capitalist mode of production. As the same Jesús Martín-Barbero points out:

We cannot think any more of difference without thinking of inequality. Hence talking about regional identity implies not only customs and dialects, rhythms and handicraft but also social marginalisation, economic deprivation and exclusion of political decision-making. A region consists as much of cultural expressions as of social situations, by which the unequal development of the countries is made visible. (Martín-Barbero 1994: 91)

Apparently, this seems to be a dilemma. Socio-economic marginalisation can hardly be accepted as a desirable status. But every program to overcome marginalisation could endanger the very base of certain cultural articulations or even identities and thus be the expression of an ideological and centristic point of view. In its worst forms, it may even be totalitarian. Therefore, it is not a solution to evaluate cultural or political articulations by analyzing whether they attempt to overcome marginality or not. If taken seriously, one has to accept those articulations as articulations, not projecting one's own wishes and political attitudes into them. That is to say, there is no longer a possibility to condemn e.g. a local political movement for its lack of profound critics of socio-economic structures or its lack of attempts to win some of the center's possibilities for the marginalized. On the other hand, it would be cynical to remain (as an scientist, a politician, a member of society) in the center, enjoying all those cultural articulations at the margins, that - for good or for bad - will not ever become a danger for the status quo, because there is no concern for society as a whole any more.
One could argue that there might be very diverse sorts of marginalisation and that cultural marginalisation does not necessarily (if at all) tie to social or socio-economic marginalisation. That would imply the dialectics stated above would be rather contingent, and within a liberal society the struggle for and the recognition of cultural articulations is not connected to the socio-economic aspects of society. On the contrary, we think it is impossible to conceive cultural without socio-economic marginalisation. Those who are not marginalized socio-economically will always find ways to be perceived with their cultural expressions and can thus not be regarded as marginalized. It might be the case that not all of those who are marginalized in a socio-economic way are also marginalized to the same degree in cultural terms (and this view could also be a result of the culturalistic turn in the social sciences and in anthropologies in the 1980s). On the other hand, those who are culturally marginalized will always confront socio-economic marginalisation of a similar degree.
It is not only a moral dilemma; it is also a profound problem for critical social science. Since the economic structure still must be regarded as one of the basic elements of society (if not the basic element), it is impossible to ignore the interdependency of cultural expressions within the positively evaluated difference (also with all its potentiality of opposition, resistance and maybe even emancipation) and the brutal socio-economic inequality and repression that is originally constituting marginalisation. But accepting this dialectical interdependency means - at the first sight - to accept a theoretical dilemma, normative aporia.

2. The Cultural Challenge of Social Sciences

As far as can be seen, the dilemma for the critical social science consists in the demand of not only describing society and its phenomena, but also evaluating it by a normative point of view. It is challenging to accept that there should be two contradictory evaluations of phenomena grounded in one and the same cause. But the mere fact that it is possible to perceive of such a contradiction is in itself the result of a sort of scientific progress, of an increasing differentiation in social analysis. Basically, it is due to the overcoming of a simplifying model of capitalist society that systematically underestimated culture and - more importantly - cultural expressions as such. Antonio Gramsci was the first who recognized culture's potential value for social transformation.
The following theoretical progress of and within Cultural Studies brought the possibility of grounding social analysis on those who are affected by social, political, economic and cultural marginalisation. It still must be regarded as the most adequate way of empirical and hermeneutical investigation of society. However, one could gain the impression that in the course of the 1980s, Cultural Studies to some extend lost the contact with broader social and political theory - and even with their own roots. These roots lie in Gramscian Marxist theory, linking social science and social analysis with the claim of changing society. Those scientists saw themselves as organic intellectuals and their investigation of (sub-) culture also attempted to displace the coordinates of cultural hegemony.
But even if this attitude at present seems a bit anachronistic, what still should be one of the basic demands within Cultural Studies is twofold: First, in order to understand society, the analysis of culture is indispensable. And this analysis must include not only those cultural articulations accepted as such by the hegemonic center of society, but also those articulations opposing the generally accepted and recognized culture, going beyond it, being destructive to it or merely residing outside of it or at its margins. Especially in Latin America, where it is difficult (if not impossible) to define a high culture delimiting it from low, popular or subculture, nearly every attempt to deal with the concept of cultural identity will predominantly have to deal with popular culture:

And this is true as much for the populist political discourse as for the critical discourse and the scientific investigation. The reason for this lies in the presence of cultural differences in these societies which are not reducible to counter-cultural dissidence or to the museum; it lies in the validity and plurality of the popular, indicating the space of deep conflicts and of a dynamics impossible to ignore" (Martín-Barbero 1994: 92).

Second, to understand culture, it must be seen within its social context, within the context of its production. Thus, cultural analysis must be linked reflexively to socio-economic analysis. To say it in elder terminology: Political economy is one of the basic instruments of social theory. And a culturalistic analysis rejecting the necessity of a broader perspective is always in danger to become apologetical. Recognizing cultural articulations as such does not mean to romanticize them.
This second point is not generally shared by a majority of cultural theorists. But there are voices revindicating exactly this point, e.g. Douglas Kellner, who states

that cultural studies today should return to earlier models of British cultural studies and put in question the current rejection of political economy, class, ideology and question the postmodern turn in cultural studies. I believe that the turn away from the problematic shared to some extent with the Frankfurt School has vitiated contemporary British and North American cultural studies and that a return to critical social theory and political economy is a necessary move for a revitalized cultural studies. This project requires a new cultural studies that articulates the sort of analysis of political economy developed by the Frankfurt School with the emphasis on subversive moments of media culture, oppositional subculture and an active audience developed by British cultural studies" (Kellner 1997: 25).

The described diagnosis of aporia between constructive difference and destructive inequality is therefore due to the complexity of society itself, when we try to describe it from within its very processes. The demand for such an adequate analysis became quite common in the 1990s - in Latin America, but also elsewhere. This has not always been the case: The "traditional left" (Brunner 1988: 409) did not see that there is power not only in the state's institutions (and especially in the institutions of repression), and they therefore fought for power only by ways of oppositional parties, unions and - as ultima ratio - with armed organizations. They systematically underestimated culture - and cultural hegemony - as an original field of power within society, as much a field of conserving the status quo as to overcome it. We shall argue, therefore, that it will be necessary to concentrate on the concept of civil society as a basic category not only for the understanding of democracy itself, but also of the possibilities within liberal democracies to overcome to some extent socio-economic marginality - essentially by the marginalized themselves.

3. Cultural Consciousness and Civil Society

3.1. Politics and Culture: Conceptional Changes

What seems important within that "cultural turn" is the attempt to redefine politics. While the traditional analysis of society centered on the state ("In the unconscious of the traditional left, there was always the state, never civil society" [Brunner 1988: 418]), the "cultural turn" provides a more open concept of what might be regarded as political. Therefore also the notion of democracy changed: What formerly was considered a mere instrument of bourgeois power, is now seen as the realm of very different kind of political articulations that need not belong to politics in a narrower sense. This is partly due to the overcoming of a notion of politics that saw participation by, of and within the political parties as the only possibility of participation at all.

Because we appreciate the radicalism of democracy as a form as much as content which allows to change life, to transform social relations and to create new possibilities to articulate them in economy, in politics, in culture and in all the spheres of everyday existence of men and women. (Brunner 1988: 429)

Especially new social movements overcome the traditional definition of politics by redefining them in cultural terms. They discover politics as a realm of the production of social meaning and hence they move on the ground of cultural dimensions of everyday life.
There are "new forms of theoretical awareness [that] have been fostered by equally significant changes in historical conditions and, more specifically, by changes in the popular practices of resistance and collective action themselves" (Escobar/Alvarez 1992: 2).
This change is partly due to the devaluation of traditional politics (political parties and trade unions, primarily) both in its ability to provide effective solutions to society's problems and in its ability to offer consistent social meanings. Scholars studying social movements have pointed out to the necessity of accepting a more culturalistic standpoint:

[...] these new social movements should not be interpreted in terms of politics (if by that term the struggle for power is understood), but as praxis centered in the construction of collective identities and of acknowledgement of spheres of social relations. (Jelin 1989: 14)

This does not only mean the creation of new forms of politics, it means also new forms of social relations (ibid.: 17). In the end they are disputing the limits of politics and the definition of the public sphere (ibid. and Lechner 1982). The state is no longer the "object of attraction" for many movements, but it remains their point of reference (Calderón/Piscitelli/Reyna 1992: 24-25). They struggle to win recognition and for political spaces of expression. Although we share this point of view, it still seems necessary to distinguish non-political cultural expressions from political ones. Seriously regarding the statement of Martín-Barbero quoted above, that the cultural analysis of politics does not mean to "politicize" everything (as happened in the late 1960s and in the 1970s), we shall argue that neither should there be a "culturalization" of everything (as happened in the 1980s and still in the 1990s by some kind of postmodern readings).
Despite the political potential of nearly every cultural articulation only those which first have some kind of political consciousness of their action and second aim at a certain change or influence within the political process are able to realize such a potential by their own means. By political consciousness we do not mean ideology, profound social analysis or any deeper-rooted political commitment. People seeing their actions as political already have an understanding of the problem as a political question, however diffuse it might be.
Therefore, there should be at least rough criteria whether a collective action should be considered as political or not. First, there is political potential probably in every sort of collective action. Nevertheless, that mere potential does not yet make an action political. Second, on the level of the actors, there might be a kind of intention to bring about a certain reaction by the political and/or social environment. This intention we call political - in a broader sense. Third, to every collective action, there might be a reaction by the political and/or social environment, independently if the actors intended it or not. Nonetheless, the reaction does not need to fulfill the expectations of the intention (if there is one). Important is only, if there is any kind of reaction or not. If there is a reaction, we can call that political effectiveness de facto. We will consider a collective action as political when there is an intention as described above and/or when there is a reaction to that action. Only if such a reaction is neither intended nor de facto taking place, we will not consider it political, despite its political potential. (The case that there is a reaction intended without showing any results will happen rarely, if at all.)

Status of Collective Action: Matrix of Political Potential

3.2. Civil Society: Self-Reflexiveness and Inclusion

Our hypothesis is that within democracy, political expression of marginalized sectors may enable themselves to counteract the processes of (socioeconomic) exclusion - maintaining their cultural difference and identity.
To develop our argument we need to refer to the concept of civil society as a fundamental element of democracy. Civil society is a sphere of articulation beyond the state that provides the possibility for the inclusion of diverse forms of articulations, also from the social and/or cultural margins. Thereby, it has the chance of an increasing flexibility and openness of society and in the end of democracy itself, as it can take in and incorporate interests of low scales of organizational potential. And it constitutes a possibility to create a new sensibility to divergent articulations, especially in societies that confront deep cultural differences.
The mere institutional frame of democracy as such is not able to provide the improvement of the conditions of life for its citizens. It needs to be backed by civil society. Following Jürgen Habermas, actors in civil society are characterized by

the twofold orientation of their politics: with their programmatic politics they influence directly the political system. At the same time they are reflexively concerned with stabilization and expansion of civil society and public sphere and with the assurance of their own identity and ability to act. (Habermas 1992a: 447; italics original)

As a third dimension, the very institutions have to be controlled not only mutually by themselves, but also by civil society - especially under conditions of democratic transition. Put simply, the institutional frame may guarantee the right for political articulations and participation (which includes the constitutional guarantees of civil rights). That may be realized by "traditional" forms of politics such as political parties and trade unions, and there is little doubt that for the time being those forms will be essential to highly differentiated societies. But while those forms are relatively closed and always endangered to follow only an internal systemic logic of power (sensu Max Weber), civil society provides a possibility for articulations within "autonomous public spheres" (Habermas), and thus constituting another kind of oppositional power (sensu Hannah Arendt). Civil society, in this understanding, means the self-reflexiveness of society.
By the different political articulations within the public sphere, society learns about itself in all its aspects. The potential infinity of such articulations provides the openness of the political process. These prerequisites for such a process are nevertheless not easily fulfilled. The constitutional guarantees of civil rights are necessary, but they are not yet sufficient conditions for civil society. What is additionally needed is a 'supportive spirit' (as Habermas calls it) of the political culture. This includes not only the citizens' willingness to articulate opinions, demands and (cultural) identities, but also the openness to listen to other articulations.
If both conditions are given, there is a real chance for an increasingly strong civil society that is able to fulfill the two demands of the Habermasian definition. By that way, civil society will also be able to exercise a sort of public control on the political institutions. This control is a kind of by-product of the reflexiveness of society. If civil society becomes aware of itself, it becomes also aware of its own importance - and by creating a public consciousness of the importance of civil society, the political system is automatically set under a relevant pressure concerning its actions and structures.
This pressure could then lead to a broadening of civil society itself - and hence to the inclusion of formerly excluded forms of political articulations. There are - at least - two preconditions for this chance for inclusion. First, the willingness of the citizens to articulate themselves already has a cultural and a socioeconomic dimension that preestablishes the disposition for articulations. The second condition, which will be treated separately in the following chapter, refers to the self-reflexiveness of civil society that includes the idea of institutionalization, i.e. the respect for democratic institutions and the recognition of their potential for societal transformation.
When discussing the possible articulations of a self-reflexive civil society, the limitations imposed by cultural and socioeconomic obstacles should be kept in mind. Cultural patterns as well as socioeconomic restrictions might provide serious limitations to free articulations within civil society. As Max Weber showed, capitalist development (and liberal democracy) is based on certain structures of social values and practices, i.e. marginalisation does not only mean economic exclusion, but it is often based on discrimination, that means, the non-acceptance of divergent pattern of thoughts, values, believes and narratings. This is what its claim for recognition of (cultural) difference ultimately is based upon. It is important to state that the forms of articulation and participation that will most likely be heard by the center are the ones corresponding to its own structure of perception. More 'strange' articulations will probably only be acknowledged when the development of civil society has reached a high level of cultural openness and a certain level of socio-economic inclusion.
There has been, and still is, much discussion about the relationship of democracy and social justice. It has often been questioned if one can talk about democratic participation under conditions of socioeconomic exclusion. It seems obvious that at least a minimum satisfaction of basic needs is necessary to allow participation. On the other hand, articulations of protest and disobedience to the means of domination and exclusion can develop on very 'low scales' of collective action: "Social movements of subordinated groups can not develop without a minimum of access and a minimum of 'humanity', as much in the material sense as in the sense of belonging to a community and of the capacity of reflection concerning identity construction" (Jelin 1996: 61).
Taking a closer look at the everyday life of people living at the margins of society - at least in Latin America -, such reflections, such sense of community can be found. And this consists also in practices - as mentioned above - that show a certain sense of opposition, of resistance: from collective theft of electricity to organized local political movements. Without overestimating the political, social or cultural potential that lies in those practices, we can state with Elisabeth Jelin: "These practices of resistance are, in a certain sense, the manifestation of a minimum of autonomy and reflection of the subject" (Jelin 1996: 61).
It is important in this context to stress the interdependency between cultural and political (and social) patterns. Without a certain self-reflection and identity construction, there can be no political articulation. On the other hand: The experience of collective action promotes the construction of identity. Both is only possible on the grounds of a minimum of satisfaction of the basic needs.
To put it simple: It is thus a reciprocal process within civil society that can provide a strengthening both, civil society itself and the inclusion of marginalized sectors. A vital civil society provides certain openness. This refers as much to cultural articulations as to political conflicts. Marginalized sectors may - if the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled - articulate their cultural, political and social demands. These articulations and demands should be heard in the realm of the public sphere. If not, they have to be made heard. The effect should be twofold: The acknowledgement of the articulations and demands should grow, and the openness of civil society towards such articulations too. By that, civil society itself will become more reflexive and hence more powerful.
The general acknowledgement of articulations and demands of marginalized sectors puts them on the political agenda. This does not necessarily mean that the demands will be fulfilled. But it does mean the overcoming of a political marginalisation. At the same time, this acknowledgement is not endangering the cultural basis of the articulations themselves in terms of identity - otherwise, it would not be acknowledgement but paternalism. Still, there are formal political prerequisites for such a scenario. We will shortly outline them.

4. Conditions of a Self-Reflexive Civil Society

The self-reflexiveness of civil society includes the idea of institutionalization, i.e. the respect for institutions as guarantees for the existence of civil society itself and the recognition of their potential for social changes within the given institutional framework. At the same time, the efficiency of rights and their legal establishment depends on the respect of the state for the rule of law and a culture of self-limitation within society. The conditions e.g. in Latin America remind us that this is not always given. The recognition of the role of democratic institutions in the sense of the recognition of citizenship rights is a basic condition for a society to become self-reflexive.

4.1. Self-Reflexiveness and Institutionalization

Self-reflexiveness or self-limitation has a double meaning referring to the state and to civil society: It means the limitation of the state, the restriction of its expansive tendencies, and it means the self-limitation of civil society, i.e. the renunciation of replacing the state by society (Dubiel 1994: 75f). In this understanding civil society is to be maintained as an autonomous sphere of self-organization and articulation without jeopardizing the state as such. Actors within society (at least in their majority) do not aim to overcome social plurality and they do not see themselves as representatives of the totality of society. Even though single actors may have different objects, the totality of articulations of civil society's diverse actors still has self-limiting character.
Cohen and Arato (1992) have recalled on the two dimensions of modern civil society. Civil society is created through a self-mobilization and a self-constitution, with the latter meaning its institutionalization by laws and subjective rights. In situations where there are no such guarantees, especially under the rule of dictatorship, civil society is reduced to its mobilized forms. For the reproduction of modern civil society, both sides are necessary. Thus the constitution of modern civil society is linked to the dialectics of the collective action of social movements and the legal stabilization of their success through the implementation of protecting rights (see Peruzzotti 1995: 15). Fundamental rights are the product of struggles from below. The historic social movements which aimed to redefine and expand the concept of citizenship represented fights for incorporation and participation of new sectors in civil society, i.e. they were orientated to realize the concept of civil society itself (Peruzzotti 1995: 16; Cohen/Arato 1992: 441). The structure of fundamental rights assured by constitutionalism along with judicial independence is the basis for a civil society in the sense of an institutionalized structure. Still, they have to be translated into positive law to become effective (Cohen/Arato 1992: 414). Additionally, they depend on a state able and willing to enforce the established norms. On the other hand, the actual fulfillment also depends on a civil society conscious of the importance of its institutional establishment. The fundamental rights, positive law and a corresponding state guarantee the existence of an autonomous sphere of free articulation, but its reality still depends on a civil society disposed to act within those norms and to assert them:

The fundamental rights constitute the realm of the social as civil society, guaranteeing judicially the autonomy of the social against potential dangers by political (or economic) power; but their effectiveness is based on the existence of state power that is disposed to make them respected and on the presence of a culture of self-limitation of a civil society. (Peruzzotti 1995: 22)

Following Cohen and Arato (1992: 57), one can distinguish three possible developments of civil society, especially in the post-authoritarian states of the Southern Cone, but mutatis mutandis these developments can probably also be found in other Latin American countries:

1   Civil society could lose its value for social actors with the restoration of democracy, a process in which the political society will play the major role.

2   Civil society could become over-politicized. It would then implicitly seek to abolish, on behalf of several of its sectors, societal plurality itself and/or to devalue mediations between itself and the state

3   Civil society could become self-reflexive by its self-thematization and self-normatization, as well its self-limitations vis-à-vis political society. The self-reflexive model of civil society includes not only the idea of self-limitation of civil society but also its own strengthening.

Neither the apathy of society (as in the first scenario) nor intents of abolishing its plurality (as in the second) contribute to an active and relevant civil society within the democratic order. Self-limitation, nevertheless, does not mean a de-politization of society or the subjection under strategic constraints. On the contrary, it "is actually based on learning in the service of democratic principle" (Cohen/Arato 1992: 16). Actors within civil society would no longer aim at fundamentalist projects that in history often have led to the breakdown of societal steering and the suppression of social plurality.
It seems necessary that civil society recognize its institutional dimension. This is even more necessary, as non-favorable institutional contexts will inhibit political discourses effectively, but favorable institutional contexts can by no means guarantee them (see also Offe 1989: 770). In this context the necessity of constructing a 'culture of citizenship' should be discussed. There are signs of such a process undergoing. After authoritarian repression and state intervention in private spheres, but also as a reaction on recent experiences of privatization of politics, many Latin American societies seem to aim at (re-) establishing the idea of citizenship and civil rights.

4.2. Civil Society and the 'culture of citizenship'

In the last years there has been a call for the strengthening of civil society. But political democracy does not fulfill its constitutional and institutional promises by itself. Nor does it produce a strong civil society, a culture of citizenship and a sense of social responsibilities by its own account (Jelin 1996: 63). According to our argument above, it is necessary that a given society learn about itself and its institutional frames (and guarantees), established by the democratic constitutional order. Therefore a 'culture of citizenship' has to be promoted within society and social actors. Citizenship does not so much mean a determined set of practices, but basically the idea of rights. The notion of citizenship itself refers to the status defined by civil rights (Habermas 1992b: 5). Citizenship can be regarded as the result of a continuous process of construction and changes, its basic idea is the right to have rights (Jelin 1993: 25 and 1996: 116-117.). In theory of democracy, the self-recognition as subjects of rights is often seen as an important element to make real the idea of citizenship and participation of individuals and social actors in the democratic process (see Smulovitch 1998: 161). There is not only a gap between formal positive law and its reality but also between that formality and the consciousness and practices of the so defined subjects of right (Jelin 1993: 113). Development and changes in the transitional societies of Latin America in the last years might serve as an example. They point out to the self-constitution of civil society in the sense of re-affirming its own institutional guarantees.

This is important where the idea of the institutional dimension of civil society does not yet exist or is underdeveloped. Not everywhere the constitution of civil society took place as a process of successive institutionalization of rights in the three waves of first civil, then political and ultimately social rights, as has been stated for Europe (T.H. Marshall 1950). On the contrary, the expansion of workers' and social rights in Latin America were not always a consequence of the expansion of civil and political rights (Collier/Collier 1991). Furthermore, political and socio-economic inclusion of broader sectors preceded the consolidation of the democratic order and the idea of liberal rights (Dos Santos 1988). Social policy has been used as an instrument of political engineering to reconcile the expansion of participation with the maintenance of political competition within the elites (ibid: 116). The expansion of participation via populist regimes has obscured the very notion of citizenship, as has been argued for western welfare state as well (Jelin 1996: 116). Under these conditions the idea of citizenship (in the sense of institutional guarantees of civil society) could not develop (González Bombal 1995). Most notably in Latin America today is the great variety of actors and actions (ibid.; Calderón/Piscitelli/Reyna 1992). There are such diverse forms as women movements, ethnic groups, peasant mobilizations, struggles against social exclusion, workers' organizations, ecological movements, movements aiming at decentralization and democratization, cultural articulations such as the Rastafarians in the Caribbean, students' movements and so on. The (political) importance of all these groups and movements can only be seen and adequately evaluated within an open concept of civil society that transcends the traditional definitions of politics focusing on state power, parties, and trade unions (see the matrix on page ).

5. Conclusions

In spite of the great democratic potential of inclusion that provides civil society, there should be no illusion about the difficulties of overcoming marginalisation. As stated above, marginalisation is taking place on different levels, among which the socio-economic seems to be basic. Still, the structures of thinking itself might be the form marginalisation which is most resistant to changes (and nevertheless is not independent of socio-economic factors). The overcoming of marginality is not only a topic for the political agenda in a narrow sense. To ignore certain articulations by marginalized, affirming that it is not one's fault if they are not willing or not able (who should decide?) to articulate themselves accurately (e.g. within the established forms of perceivable articulation), is not an adequate position if a normative concept of civil society is regarded seriously. The structures of the very process of marginalisation can only be made visible if every articulation by the marginalized is taken as an - possibly unintended - articulation of marginalisation itself. Gayatry Ch. Spivak describes it from a feminist deconstructionist position:

By pointing attention to a feminist marginality, I have been attempting, not to win the center for ourselves, but to point at the irreducibility of the margin in all explanations. That would not merely reverse but displace the distinction between margin and center. But in effect such pure innocence (pushing all guilt to the margins) is not possible, and, paradoxically, would put the very law of displacement and the irreducibility of the margin into question. The only way I can hope to suggest how the center itself is marginal is by not remaining outside in the margin and pointing my accusing finger at the center. I might do it rather by implicating myself in that center and sensing what politics make it marginal. Since one's vote is at the limit for oneself, the deconstructivist can use herself (assuming that one is at one's own disposal) as a shuttle between the center (inside) and the margin (outside) and thus narrate a displacement. (Spivak 1988: 107)

This point of view illuminates two points. First, there is no absolute standpoint, no archimedic point from which one could measure the world. And therefore, there is neither the right nor the possibility to tell from one particular point of view any other person or group with another point of view what to do. Second - and for our purpose more important -, even accepting the "irreducibility of the margin in all explanations", the act of narrating within the margin or narrating about marginalisation is already an intrinsically political act - at least it carries political potential in the sense defined above.
If every marginal articulation can be seen as one of marginalisation itself, it must imply also the socio-economic aspects of marginalisation, therefore also its possible critique - and thus even the potential will to change. There is no logical or historical inevitability that this potential will ever materialize. Still, it exists in every articulation from or within the margins. Within civil society as described above, there should be a structural chance to carry through the vindications resulting from the consciousness of marginality and its causes. There is, hence, a theoretical possibility within democracies backed by civil society to partially overcome socio-economic marginality. To which extent that could be, and where are the structural limits of capitalist societies to overcome marginality cannot be discussed here. There is no doubt that those limits exist and that they are not too wide. Still, it is important that there is the potential of putting socio-economic marginalisation on the political agenda and subsequently the possible attempts to overcome it, without destroying at the same time the very basis of those cultural differences that rose from the same ground as the marginalisation itself:

Cultural articulations from or within the margins are expressions of cultural difference and - as potential articulations of marginalisation itself - carry the potential attempt to overcome marginality. Marginalized cultural articulations are therefore as much originated in the same causes as socio-economic marginalisation, because it carries the potentiality to overcome the latter (within the limits of the given society) by its own means. This does not mean that marginalized cultural articulations will necessarily cause the overcoming of socio-economic marginality. It does only mean that if a chance to overcome socio-economic marginality without destroying at the same time cultural difference should exist, it can materialize only if the impulse of that overcoming resides in that very cultural difference itself.

Note

¹ That is not to say that any kind of social inequality is to be seen necessarily in a negative way. We do not argue here against e.g. John Rawls and his 'principle of difference'. What we are talking about is social inequality in terms of socio-economic marginalisation.

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