Anders Berg-Sørensen, University of Copenhagen “Democratie-à-venir” - the tragic political philosophy of Jacques Derrida

"There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy without the 'community of friends' [...], without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding."¹

1. Introduction

For at least the last decade it has been discussed whether an ethical-political turn has taken place in the works of Jacques Derrida.² I find it incontestable that Derrida in works such as "Force of Law", Specters of Marx and Politics of Friendship treats ethical, political and legal themes of relevance to the debates on Europe, the Middle East, South Africa, on multiculturalism, religious fundamentalism and ethnic conflicts.³ But even though, my claim is that Derrida's political philosophy draws on aesthetic experience and insight. It is important not to forget that Derrida has done more than a handful of aesthetic works before the ethical-political turn.

It is my claim that the key to understanding the political philosophy of Jacques Derrida is a conception of the tragic and of tragic experience. Tragic experience is informative in respect of understanding ethics, politics and law and the necessity of ethical-political decisions. In his political philosophy Derrida's aim is to argue for the necessary relation between ethics on the one hand and politics and law on the other. But this relation is also a tragic relation. It includes the tragic conflicts that you experience in the situation of decision. You have to pass through the tragic to make ethical-political decisions.

Democracy is not the essential concept in Derrida's political philosophy, but his ethical-political writings relate to a Western democratic tradition. Therefore, I consider Derrida's concept democracy-to-come ("democratie-à-venir") central to his political philosophy even though he primarily thematizes other concepts in his political philosophical writings: the concepts of justice, friendship and hospitality. Democracy-to-come is not only a political, but also an ethical concept. In that respect it includes the concepts of justice, friendship and hospitality.

Most of this presentation will concentrate on Derrida's ethical-political thinking and the relation between tragic experience and ethics, politics and law, because it is essential if you intend to understand the concept of democracy, democracy-to-come, as an ethical-political concept. After having explained Derrida's ethical-political thinking as a tragic political philosophy, I will return to an increased focus on the concept of democracy, democracy-to-come, and Derrida's idea of the New International in order to discuss these ideas in relation to the newly arisen idea of cosmopolitan or cosmopolitical democracy.⁴

First of all, I will explain what I mean by the tragic and tragic experience in order to show the role that the conception of the tragic and of tragic experience plays in Derrida's development of an ethical-political thinking. In Specters of Marx Derrida develops the central political philosophical concepts of spectrality and messianicity from readings of Shakespeare's tragedy Hamlet and Hamlet's tragic experience. Then I will argue that Derrida's concept of an aporia is comparable to the tragic with reference to aporetic and tragic experiences in the relation between justice and law. Before I take the discussion of democracy-to-come ("democratie-à-venir") I will present Derrida's idea of an ethics in relation to the concepts of justice, friendship and hospitality, the ethical relation to "the other", and his ideas of the necessary relation and the passage between ethics on the one hand and politics and law on the other.

2. "The time is out of joint" - the tragic, spectrality and messianicity

In Specters of Marx Derrida reads Hamlet as an exemplification of tragic conflicts. Through the character of Hamlet he shows the relation between tragic experience and ethical-political decisions. He invents some of the central concepts of his ethical-political thinking, the concepts of spectrality and messianicity through his readings of Hamlet, which emphasizes the role the tragic plays in Derrida's political philosophy. The reason why he reads Hamlet and not the Greek tragedies of Sophocles, Antigone and King Oedipus, is the specter, the specter of Hamlet's father in Shakespeares tragedy. Derrida's aim is to write a genealogy of spectrality in European culture starting with Shakespeare and thematized by Marx, because Marx himself is treated as a specter in Europe today.⁵ The idea that Europe has reached the end of history with a liberal democracy and a capitalist marked-economy is a conjuring against Marx and his specter.

By the tragic I refer to: i) the experience of finitude: that as a human being you have a finite existence with death as your constitutive horizon, and you experience this when the dead persons rule over the living; ii) the limits of political and legal institutions: that the political and legal institutions are constituted by human beings, for which reason they are limited; iii) the inherent contradictory principles in the existing political and legal order: that the reasons of problematization of justice and political legitimacy are inherent in the political and legal institutions.

In Hamlet the tragic is related to the death of Hamlet's father and his specter, which haunts Hamlet. On the one hand Hamlet experiences that "the time is out of joint"; that there is something unjust related to his fathers death and Claudius' reigning as the king but he cannot get a full knowledge of the crime committed against his father. His father is the only one who can bear witness to the crime, and he has taken the knowledge with him into the grave. Therefore the specter haunts Hamlet. Hamlet experiences his own finitude through this situation as he gets "out of joint" himself. On the other hand, in this situation, "the time is out of joint", Hamlet is compelled to pass through the tragic experience to do justice. It is caused by this situation Hamlet decides to do justice, to take revenge and restore the order but it is impossible without committing a new crime. The tragic experience and the ethical-political decision are in-between this tension between possibility and impossibility.

In his reading of Shakespeare's tragedy Derrida develops two central concepts for his political philosophy: spectrality and messianicity. In some sense spectrality is related to the past and messianicity to the future, but in another sense they have the same meaning as the thing you cannot comprehend even though it is constitutive of your comprehension. The specter is the witness of the past that you cannot get a full knowledge of and therefore it haunts you. The specter sees you without you seeing it. Derrida refers to hauntology as constitutive of ontological thinking, because ontology is always limited by the spectrality. It is the spectrality that makes ontology possible, but at the same time it makes an ontological closure impossible. Later on I will explain how this thinking of spectrality, hauntology and ontology is comparable to Levinas' thoughts on ethics as first philosophy.

While spectrality is related to the past messianicity is related to the future as a possibility to do justice and make just decisions. The concept of messianicity is inspired by Walter Benjamin's expression "weak Messianic power" and the critical potential that can be deduced from this conception,⁶ but Derrida prefers to refer to messianicity without messianism because he will not associate the concept with the traditional Jewish conception of messianism as a waiting for the coming of Messiah. The messianicity does not have a specific content as the Jewish messianism does. It is a universal, quasi-transcendental formal structure that is experienced at one and the same time in concrete historical situations and it transcends these situations.⁷ Compared to the Jewish messianism the messianicity is a waiting without expectations to the coming. It is an undeconstructible idea of justice that is affirmative to the coming or the idea of a democracy-to-come and that makes critique and deconstruction possible.⁸

The tragic experience and the concepts of spectrality and messianicity are related to the question: What is deconstruction? "Deconstruction is justice", Derrida writes in "Force of Law".⁹ So far I have suggested the tension between the idea of justice as undeconstructible and the possibility of justice; the affirmative condition of a possibility of a critique of ontology. But at the same time this universal, quasi-transcendental structure has a negative form. It is unrepresentable and therefore related to tragic experience.

3. Law and justice - aporias and tragic experience

In "Force of Law" Derrida discusses the aporias between law and justice. It is my claim that the aporias are comparable to tragic experience. In this part I will explain how aporias and tragic experience are comparable. Both of them indicate a conflict between two contradictory imperatives in a situation where it is necessary to act. Etymologically an aporia means a non-road or a passage that you cannot pass through. The aporetic experience is an experience that you get in a situation where you have to make a decision. Whether the decision is just or unjust is contestable and never insured by a specific rule.¹⁰ You do not have any ontological foundation or security in the aporetic situation.

In short the aporias between law and justice discussed by Derrida in "Force of Law" are a tension between on the one hand an idea of the law as general and universal and on the other justice as related to singularity. The aim of the idea of the law as general and universal is order and security, whereas justice is related to the idea of an ethical relation to "the other" as unique and singular before any kind of generalization og universalization takes place. The law is constructed and therefore deconstructible, whereas justice is deconstruction and therefore undeconstructible. The law is given by a performative act that institutes the point of reference for the authority of the law at the same time as it institutes the law. The law is given with itself as the authoritative point of reference. That indicates the 'mystical foundation of authority' that Derrida writes about.¹¹ It is because the law is instituted in this way that it is deconstructible. This tension between law and justice is illustrative of the tragic understood as an experience: i) of finitude, ii) of the limitations of political and legal institutions, and iii) of the inherent contradictory principles in the political and legal institutions.

Derrida gives three examples of the aporias between law and justice:¹² A. The first aporia is named "épochè and rule": On the one hand a free and responsible decision is made in relation to the singularity of the situation, and therefore it has to interrupt the rule of law, but on the other hand the decision has to follow a rule and be calculable, if it should be free and responsible. The first aporia shows the tension between a decision that conforms to duty and a decision made out of a sense of duty, as Kant would say: Pflichtmässig and aus Pflicht.¹³ The aporia underlines that neither the decision that conforms to duty nor the decision made out of duty is possible without the heteronomy or heterogeneity that spectrality denotes.

B. The second aporia is named "the ghost of the undecidable": In every decision there are traces of undecidability. There will always be relevant elements that cannot be represented in the decision because it is impossible to get a full knowledge of them as well as it is impossible to comprehend the specter. But at the same time it is necessary to experience this spectral undecidability for making a decision. The decision is made because of the undecidability and therefore there are traces of undecidability in the decision. The second aporia underlines why Derrida reads Hamlet instead of Antigone or King Oedipus. The line, "the time is out of joint" states the tragic experience of spectrality and undecidability that the Greek tragedies do not thematize.

C. The third aporia is named "the urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge": What is meant is that even though you examine and interpret a situation as carefully as possible within a horizon of knowledge, you will come to a point where you have to make a decision, hic et nunc, that cannot be calculable if it has to be just. You will often be caught in a situation where you have to make a decision and accept that it is impossible to get a full and calculable knowledge for deciding. Every decision is a performative act that either reinstitutes the rule or constitutes a new one.

In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas Derrida calls the performative act a political invention. You can say that the performative act or political invention is an ethical-political decision that has necessarily passed through the undecidable and is informed by or more precisely driven by the tragic experience. The idea of democracy as a democracy-to-come ("democratie-à-venir") is an ethical-political concept related to this conception of justice as a performative act or political invention.

4. Ethics - justice, friendship and hospitality

In "Force of Law", Specters of Marx and Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas Derrida defines justice as the ethical relation to "the other".¹⁴ The ethical relation is a face-to-face-relation, where you experience "the other" through his face. The face is what you can perceive of "the other". It means that the face is the trace of "the other", and that in the face-to-face-relation you also experience the infinity of "the other" who transcends yourself.¹⁵ "The other" is what you cannot comprehend, the specter, the infinity, death, or God. Therefore the face-to-face-relation is an experience of your own finitude. Even though the ethical relation is a relation, it is an experience of radical separation too. The radical separation between you and "the other" who transcends your horizon of knowledge.

In the relation to "the other" the ethical is the welcome of "the other" directed to the face of "the other".¹⁶ The welcome is an affirmative act towards "the other" or a saying yes to "the other". The welcome of "the other" denotes an objective as well as a subjective genitive. The welcome is directed to "the other" but it is "the other" that makes the welcome possible. Without "the other" whom to welcome there would not be any welcome. "The other" makes the possibility of subjectivity and receptivity into a capacity of reason. Subjectivity, intentionality and receptivity comes from "the other", not from oneself as in a cartesian cogito. The ethical self is not a just being in its essence, but in its capacity to do justice to "the other", a capacity given by "the other" in the face-to-face-relation.

In the light of this conception of ethics as being constitutive of subjectivity, intentionality and receptivity, Derrida refers to Levinas' thoughts on ethics as first philosophy. Ethics is constitutive of ontological thinking. Without the ethical relation to "the other" that interrupts our unreflected daily practices ontological thinking would be impossible even though an ontological closure is impossible too because of "the other". Derrida indicates this conception of ethics as first philosophy in his concepts of hauntology as constitutive of ontology. The specter that haunts us is "the other", and it haunts us because of our bad conscience that it makes possible.

The welcome of "the other" or the saying yes to "the other" is then the beginning of intersubjectivity and the dialogue between you and "the other" in the face-to-face-relation. But in the relation between you and "the other" there is already a third. The third is a call for justice. The third is the question that succeeds the affirmative yes to the other. The aim of the question is to make the unconditional responsibility to "the other" that friendship and hospitality mark into a universal justice. Thus the third indicates the tension between the singular and the universal imperative or the ethical and political-legal imperative. Therefore the third denotes the tragic experience in the relation to "the other".

5. Ethics, politics and law - "democratie-à-venir" and the new international

As I already have indicated, there is a hiatus between on the one hand ethics as the relation to "the other" and on the other hand politics and law. As a call for justice, the third marks the passage between ethics, politics and law, but it is a passage without ontological foundation and security. Therefore, the hiatus is a tragic experience that gives the possibility of doing justice and of making an ethical-political decision as a performative act that reinstitutes the law or constitutes a new one. This decision is necessary:

"This relation is necessary, it must exist, it is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from ethics. This deduction is necessary in order to determine the "better" or the "less bad," with all the requisite quotation marks: democracy is "better" than tyranny. [...] It seems to dictate this to me: the formal injunction of the deduction remains irrecusable, and it does not wait any more than the third and justice do. Ethics enjoins a politics and a law: this dependence and the direction of this conditional derivation are as irreversible as they are unconditional. But the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts, all possible intuition, in a singular way, in the speech and the responsibility taken by each person, in each situation, and on the basis of an analysis that is each time unique - unique and infinite, unique but a priori exposed to substitution, unique and yet general, interminable in spite of the urgency of the decision. For the analysis of a context and of political motivations can have no end as soon as it includes in its calculations a limitless past and future. As always, the decision remains heterogeneous to the calculations, knowledge, science, and consciousness that nonetheless condition it."¹⁷

The ethical-political decision is made out of the call for justice in the ethical relation of friendship and hospitality. It is driven by messianicity, which I characterized as a universal, quasi-transcendental structure earlier, and it is as such a decision directed to the face of "the other". The face symbolizes the trace between transcendence and immanence. You could call it the transcendence-in-immanence, because it is the part of "the other" that you can perceive. The ethical-political decision made possible by "the other" and directed to the face of "the other" is transcendent-in-immanence too. It is a decision with a concrete content within the universal, quasi-transcendental structure that messianicity forms.

Derrida's idea of a democracy-to-come ("democratie-à-venir") is an example of messianicity, whereas his idea of the New International examplifies a performative act or political invention.¹⁸ The democracy-to-come includes the ideas of justice, friendship and hospitality which means that it is an ethical-political idea constituted by and open towards the heteronomy and heterogeneity of "the other". Or in other words, it is open towards a plurality of human beings. The democracy-to-come is a promise to "the other" to act in responsibility to "the other" and in that sense it is an affirmative act. At the same time it is a critique of existing political and legal institutions.

With the point of reference in today's Europe devastated by ethnic, national and religious conflicts and met by stateless and homeless people, Derrida proposes the New International as a political invention. The New International is a call for rethinking politics and law without nation-states as the founding units directed at "the other", for example the stateless and homeless people. It is a call for friendship and hospitality without or beyond institutions. In that sense the idea of a New International is very abstract in general.

Therefore I have chosen to conclude my presentation with a short discussion of the newly arisen idea of cosmopolitan or cosmopolitical democracy formulated among others by Daniele Archibugi.¹⁹ The reason why I consider it relevant to discuss whether the idea of cosmopolitical democracy is a more concrete answer to Derrida's ideas of a democracy-to-come and the New International is first of all that the aim of the work on cosmopolitical democracy is to rethink democracy independent of the nation-states, not unlike Derrida's aim. Secondly, the idea of cosmopolitical democracy does not have a fixed concept of democracy. Rather, the concept of democracy is pretended to be in development and not a fixed model of democracy. Thirdly, the reason why we must rethink democracy and invent the idea of a cosmopolitical democracy is provoked by the developments in Europe and in the international community such as the globalisation of the economy, the acknowledgement of environmental problems considered to be global problems, the demands for political autonomy by ethnic, national and religious groups etc.

The idea of cosmopolitical democracy involves still further democratization and extension and development of democracy. It suggests the possibilities of governance in accordance with democratic principles at different levels in the international community and democratization of the international institutions. Even though the aim is to rethink democracy independent of the nation-states, the idea of cosmopolitical democracy is still conditioned by the nation-states. Individual persons are thought to play a more central role than they do today in relation to the European Union or the United Nations, but the nation-states are still the units in the cosmopolitical democracy.

Derrida criticizes Kant's cosmopolitanism that the idea of universal hospitality is thought only in relation to political and legal institutions and that it is conditioned by the nation-states. The same critique can be directed to the idea of cosmopolitical democracy. Even though the idea of cosmopolitical democracy is critical to the nation-states, it is conditioned by the nation-states and therefore limited by the existing thinking of political and legal institutions. It misses the ethical dimension or rather the alterity that transcends this thinking. The idea of a democracy-to-come is a call for political invention that necessarily has to pass through the tragic, and a part of the tragic wisdom is that the democracy-to-come will never be representable. From this point of view the idea of cosmopolitical democracy is not critical enough because it is still thought possible to realize a cosmopolitical democracy in general and in that respect it represents a fixed model of democracy although it pretends the reverse. It does not think democracy as ethical-political acts or decisions in concrete situations: as a democracy-to-come ("democratie-à-venir").

In other word, the idea of cosmopolitical democracy do not reflect the historical foundations and conditions of democracy, of democratic procedures and rights, of representation, of territoriality and last, but not least of human rights sufficiently. Therefore I do not consider this idea more fruitful, concrete and applicable than Derrida's democracy-to-come even though it seems so. I think we have to go another way: back to the historical sources that we would like to interprete, and in this respect I think we rather than refusing Derrida should get inspired by his aesthetic-ethical-political thinking on interpretation as a fruitful horizon of analysis. My reading of Derrida emphasizes that tragic and aesthetic experience pinpoints the limits of politics and law and in that respect it is informative to ethical reflection of politics and law. The ideas of a democracy-to-come and the New International are examples of tragic-informed ethical reflections of the political and legal way to handle ethnic and religious conflicts.

Notes

¹ Derrida, Jacques (1997): Politics of Friendship. London: Verso, p. 22.

² Beardsworth, Richard (1996): Derrida and the Political. London: Routledge; Bernstein, Richard J. (1991): "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Jacques Derrida", in Bernstein, Richard J.: The New Constellation. The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 172-198; Critchley, Simon (1992): The Ethics of Deconstruction. Derrida and Levinas. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; Critchley, Simon (1999): Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought. London: Verso.

² Derrida, Jacques (1990): "Force of Law. The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 11, Nos. 5-6, pp. 919-1045; Derrida, Jacques (1994): Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. London: Routledge; Derrida, Jacques (1997): Politics of Friendship. London: Verso.

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⁴ Archibugi, Daniele (1998): "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy", in Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler (Eds.): Re-imagining Political Democracy. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 198-228; Archibugi, Daniele (2000): "Cosmopolitical Democracy", New Left Review, Vol. 4, pp. 137-150; Beetham, David (1998): "Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy", in Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler (Eds.): Re-imagining Political Democracy. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 58-71.

⁵ Derrida, Jacques (1994): Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. London: Routledge, pp. 4-10.

⁶ Benjamin, Walter (1999) [1968]: "Theses on the Philosophy of History", in Benjamin, Walter: Illuminations. London: Pimlico, pp. 245-255.

⁷ Derrida, Jacques (1999): "Marx & Sons", in Sprinker, Michael (Ed.): Ghostly Demarcations. A Symposion on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx. London: Verso, pp. 249-256.

⁸ Derrida, Jacques (1994): Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. London: Routledge, pp. 167-69.

⁹ Derrida, Jacques (1990): "Force of Law. The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 11, Nos. 5-6, p. 945.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 947.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 941-943.

¹² Ibid., pp. 961-973.

¹³ Derrida, Jacques (1993): Aporias. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴ Derrida, Jacques (1990): "Force of Law. The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 11, Nos. 5-6, p. 959; Derrida, Jacques (1994): Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. London: Routledge, p. 23; Derrida, Jacques (1999): Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 10.

¹⁵ Derrida, Jacques (1999): Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 51-52; Derrida, Jacques (1999): "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility. A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", in Kearney, Richard and Mark Dooley (Eds.): Questioning Ethics. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. London: Routledge, pp. 65-83.

¹⁶ Derrida, Jacques (1999): Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 15-123.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 115-116.

¹⁸ Derrida, Jacques (1994): Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. London: Routledge, pp. 64-66, pp. 84-87.

¹⁹ Archibugi, Daniele (1998): "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy", in Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler (Eds.): Re-imagining Political Democracy. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 198-228; Archibugi, Daniele (2000): "Cosmopolitical Democracy", New Left Review, Vol. 4, pp. 137-150; Beetham, David (1998): "Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy", in Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler (Eds.): Re-imagining Political Democracy. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 58-71.

References

Archibugi, Daniele (1998): "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy", in Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler (Eds.): Re-imagining Political Democracy. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 198-228.

Archibugi, Daniele (2000): "Cosmopolitical Democracy", New Left Review, Vol. 4, pp. 137-150.

Beardsworth, Richard (1996): Derrida and the Political. London: Routledge.

Beetham, David (1998): "Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy", in Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Köhler (Eds.): Re-imagining Political Democracy. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 58-71.

Benjamin, Walter (1999) [1968]: "Theses on the Philosophy of History", in Benjamin, Walter: Illuminations. London: Pimlico, pp. 245-255.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1991): "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Jacques Derrida", in Bernstein, Richard J.: The New Constellation. The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 172-198.

Critchley, Simon (1992): The Ethics of Deconstruction. Derrida and Levinas. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Critchley, Simon (1999): Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought. London: Verso.

Derrida, Jacques (1990): "Force of Law. The "Mystical Foundation of Authority", Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 11, Nos. 5-6, pp. 919-1045.

Derrida, Jacques (1993): Aporias. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1994): Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. London: Routledge.

Derrida, Jacques (1997): Politics of Friendship. London: Verso.

Derrida, Jacques (1999): Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1999): "Marx & Sons", in Sprinker, Michael (Ed.): Ghostly Demarcations. A Symposion on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx. London: Verso, pp. 213-269.

Derrida, Jacques (1999): "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility. A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida", in Kearney, Richard and Mark Dooley (Eds.): Questioning Ethics. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. London: Routledge, pp. 65-83.